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Summary  findings
Regional integration agreements (RIAs)  are ex imples of  * The optimnumi  tariffs on imports from the rest of the
second best and have an ambiguot]s impact on welfare,  world are likely to decline over time.
contend Schiff and Winters.  * Deep integration implies lower optimum external
They build a model in which RIAs unambiguously raise  tariffs if it is exogenou]s.
welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes that  * But if deep integration  is endogenous, it implies
trade between neighboring countries increases trust  higher optimum external tariffs before it occurs and
between them and reduces the likelihood of conflict.  lower ones thereafter.
The optimum intervention in that case is a subsidy on  Fnlargement of a bloc (in terms of symmetric
imports from the neighbor. The authors show that an  countries) has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs
equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries io  hutt  improves welfare, and some form of domino effect
tax imports from the rest of the world --  that is, to form  exists in the sense that enlargement increases the
an RIA  - together with imposing some domeitic taxes.  incenitive  for nonniembers to seek accession.
In fact, security threats have moved neighbcring  Although externalities associated with security matters
countries to form RIAs. Examples include the creation of  imply that an RIA may maximize welfare, this model
the European Coal and Steel Community (1991) and the  suggests that the RIA is a transitory arrangement in the
European Economic Community (1957) to reduce-  the  sense that optimumtin  trade preferences are highest at the
threat of war in Europe, as well as various RIAs among  time the RIA is formed (when securitv is low) and tend
developing countries.  to decline ovcr time. In other words, the RIA's external
Schiff and Winters show, among other things, that:  trade policy becomes increasingly open over time (as well
as following deep integration).
This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger research program on regionalism and
development (directed by the authors). Copies of the paper are availahle free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact  Jennifer Ngaine, room N5-056, telephone  202-473-7947,  fax 202-522-1159,
Internet  address  jngaine@'worldbank.org.  August  1997.  (37 pages)
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper Series  dissetninates  the  findinigs  of  work  in  progress  to  encourage  the  exchange  of  ideas  about
development  issues. An  objective  of the  series is to get  the findings  out  quickly,  even  if the presentations  are less than  full),  polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the  authors  and  shoul  I be cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of  the authors.  They  do  niot necessarily  represent  the  iview of  the  World  Bank,  its  Executive  Drrectors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
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Regional integration agreements (RIAs) are examples of seccnc uesi and hiave  an
ambiguous impact on welfare. This paper builds a model where RiAs unambigjously
raise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes that trade between neighboring
countries raises trust between them and reduice  the likelihood of conflict.  Thie  eptimum
intervention in that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor.  'The  psDer  Sh'oWS that
an equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries to tax imports fronm  the rest of the
world, i.e., to form a RIA, together with some domestic taxes.
In fact. security threats have moved neighlboring  countries to form RJAs.
Examples include the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, ('B7CSC,  i7151)
and the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) to reduce the threat o0 wvar  in
Europe,  as well as various RIAs among developing countries.
The paper shows: i)  that the optimu  m tariffs on imports from the rest Gf  tile wiorLd
are likely to decline over time; ii) deep integration implies lower optimum3  exterrnal
tariffs if deep integration is exogenous; iii)  on the cther hand, deep integration implies
higher optimum external tariffs before deep integration and lower ones thereaater if  Ireep
integration is endogenous; iv)  enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric  ountries,
has an ambiguous impact on external tariff; but raises welfare, and some form  or  QOJ2ifO
effect exists in the sense that, starting from a two-member RIA, both the ouTtside  country
and the RIA members want to enlarge the RIA.Foreword
As regional  tading arrangents  (RTAs)  have  spread,  enlarged  and deepened  over  the last
decade,  they  have posed  chalenges to economists  on both intellecftal  and policy  levels.  On the
former,  do RTAs  stimulate  growth  and investment,  fiicilitate  technology  transfer,  shift compaative
advantage  towards  high  value-added  activities,  provide  credibility  to reform  programs,  or induce
political  stability  and cooperation?  Or do they,  on the other  hand,  divert  trade  in inefficient
directions  and undermine  the multilatal  tading system?
The answer  is probably  "all of these  things,  in diffent  proportions  according  to the
particular  circmstances of each  RTA." This  then  poses  the policy  challenge  of how  best to
manage  RTAs  in order  to get the best balance  of benefits  and costs. For example,  should  technical
standards  be harmonized  and, if so, how;  do direct  or indirect  taxes  need  to be equalized;  how
should  RTAs  manage  their  interational trade  policies  in an outward-looking  fashion?
Addressing  these issues  is one important  focus  of the research  program  of the International
Trade  Division  of the World  Bank.  It has produced  a number  of methodological  innovations  in the
traditional  area  of trade effects  of RTAs  and  tackled  four  new  areas  of research:  the dynanics of
regionalism  (e.g.,  convergence,  growth,  investment,  industrial  location  and  migration),  deep
integration  (standards,  tax harmonization),  regionalism  and  the rest of the world (including  its
effects  on the multilateral  trading  system),  and certain  political  economy  dimensions  of regionalism
(e.g.,  credibility  and the use of RTAs  as tools of diplomacy).
In addition  to thematic  work,  the program  includes  a number  of studies  of specific  regional
arrangements,  conducted  in collaboration  with  the Regional  Vice  Presidencies  of the Bank. Several
EU-Mediterranean  Association  Agreements  have  been  studied  and ajoint program  with the staff  of
the Latin  American  and Caribbean  Region  entitled  "MakNg  the Most of Mercosur" is under  way.
Future  work is planned  on African  and Asian  regional  integration  schemes.
Regionalism  and  Development  findings  have  been  and  will,  in fure,  be released  in a
number  of outets. Recent  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Worldng  Papers  conceming  these  issues
include:
Glenn  Harrison,  Tom  Rutherford  and David  Tarr,  "Economic  Implications  for Turkey
of a Customs  Union  with  the European  Union,"  (WPS 1599,  May 1996).
Maurice  Schiff,  "Small  is Beautifll,  Preferential  Trade  Agreements  and the Impact  of
Country  Size,  Market  Share,  Efficiency  and Trade  Policy,"  (WPS  1668,  October  1996).
L. Alan Winters,  "Regionalism  versus  Multilateralism,"  (WPS 1687,  November  1996).
Magnus  Blomstrdm  and  Ari Kokko,  "How  Foreign  Investment  Affects  Host  Counties"
(WPS1745,  March  1997)ii
Magns  Blomstrdm  and An Kokko,  "Regional  Integrtion and Fori  Direct
Investment:  A Concptual Frmework and Three  Cases"  (WPS1750,  April 1997)
Eric Bond,  "Using  Tariff  Indices  to Evaluate  Preferential  Trading  Arngements:  An
Application  to Chile (WPS  1751,  April 1997)
Pier Carlo  Padoan,  "Technology  Accuznulation  and Diffuson: Is There  a Regional
Dimension?'  (WPS1781,  June 1997)
Won Chang  and L. Alan Winters,  "Regional  Integrtion and the Prices  of Imports: An
Empirical  Invesigation"  (WPS  1782,  June 1997)
"Glenn  Harison, Thomas  Rutherford  and  David  Tarr,  "Trade  Policy Options  for Chile:
A Quantitative  Evaluation"  (WPS1783,  June 1997)
Anthony  Venables  and Diego  Puga,  "'Trding Arrangemens  and Indusirial
Developmen (forthcorming)
Plamned  future  issues  in this series  include:
Sherry  Stephenson,  "Stndardst Conformity  Assessnents  and Developing  Countries"
Valeria  De Bonis,  "Regional  Integration  and  Factor  Income  Taxation"  and "Regional
Integration  and Commodity  Tax Harnonization
Other  papers  on regionalism  produced  by ECIT include:
Ahmed Galal  and  Bemard  Hodeman  (eds),  Regional  Parters in Global  Maret:  Limits
and  Possibilities  of the Euro-Med  Initiative.  CEPR 1997.
Berad  Hoeluan and Simeon  Djankov,  "hIports of Inputs,  Foreign  Investment  and
Reorientation  of East  European  Trade,"  World  Bank  Economic  Review  (fortmming)
Bernard  Hoekman  and Simeon  Djankov,  "The  EU's Medit  Free Trade  Initiative,"
World  Economy
Benard Hoekman  and Simeon  Djankov,  'Bffective  Proectdon  in Jordan  and  Egypt in the
Transition  to Free  Trade with  Eurpe," World  Developmnent.
Bartlomiej  Kaminsi, "Establishing  Economic  Foundations  for a Viable  State  of Bosnia  and
Hercegovina:  Issues  and Policies".iii
In addition,  Making the Most of Mercosur issued  the following  papers:
Alexander  J. Yeats,  "Does  Mercosur's  Trade  Perfrnnance  Raise  Concerns  About  the
Effects  of Regional  Trade  Arrangements?'  (WPS  1729,  Febnry  1997))
Azita Amiadi  and L. Alan  Winters,  "Transport  Costs  and 'Natual'  Ilngation  in
Macosur" (WPS  1742,  March 1997)
Claudio  Fischtak, Danny  M. Leipziger  and  John  F. Nomand, "Industial Policy  in
Mercosur:  Issues  and Lessons"
Sam Laird  (WTO),  "Mercosur  Trade  Policy:  Towards  Greater  Integrtion"
Maret  Miller  and Jerry  Caprio,  "Empirical  Evidence  on the Role  of Credit  for SME
Exports  in Mercosure
Malcom  Rowat,  "Competition  Policy  within  Mercosue,
For copies  of these  papers  or  ination  about  these  programs  contact  Mauice Schiff,  The
World  Bank, 1S18  H Steet NW, Washington,  D.C.  20433.
An additional  major  outlet  for World  Bank-sponsored  research  on regionalismn  will be the
Anual Bank  Confrence on Development  in Latin  America,  1997,  Montevideo,  June 30-July  2,
1997,  orgnized by the Office  of the Chief  Economist  and  the Technical  Deartment for Latin
America  and the Caibbean Region,  with  the support  of the International  Trade  Division  and  the
Economic  Development  Institute.
Masood  Abmed
Director
Intemational  Economics  Department[g,iRj: |  |  t  t  lI |  *  i FA  Sr|| 
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X,,,IC  '1l,  ',I'p-ically. And even if they do occur,  they need  not result  in welfare  gains. For instance,
increased  FDI  may  result  in immiserization  if it leads  to the expansion  of  protected  sectors.
One case in which  RIAs may in theory  generate  unambiguous  welfare  pins is if they
correct  eramities  For  istance, it is frequendy  claimed  that a developing  country  which  is in the
procas of refrming its trade  ,>- other  poUCili  can  benfit from  a RIA with  a large,  developed
country  or region  (e.g.,  the US or EU) because  this binds  its reform in an intrnational  treaty,
weakens  the groups  who  stand  to lose  fom and oppose  the refoms, and raises  credibility  m their
sustaiabily.3  And  even  though  the standard  static  welfae impct of such  a RIA  may  be negative
for  the reforming  country,  the latter  is likely  to gain  once  the benefits  of  the enhanced  credibility  of
the refms  are  taken  into  account.
A second  ldnd  of extmality arises  if a RIA genates  improved  security  for its member
countres. There  are basically  three  types of situations  where RIAs  may generate  such  positive
extlrnalities.  First,  there  may  bdomestic security  tbreats  such  as civil  disption or civil  war. For
instance the Egyptian  government  has been  conced  with the spead of fndimentalismand
those of Morocco  and Tunisia have been concerned  with the possibility  of contagion  from
fundamentalism  in neighboring  Algeia, with  the associated  risk of civil  strife.  These  issues,  which
have  also  been  of concern  to the  EU,  have  provided  one of the motivations  for  agreements  betwe
these  Mediternean countries  and  the EU.
Second,  counies may respond  to third-country  security  theat  by forming  a regonal
arrangement.  For instnce,  the  Southern  Afican  Development  Coordination  Conference
(SADCC),  which evenuy  developed  trading aangements  under the Southen African
3See  Fernandez  (1997)  for  an insightful  discussion  of  these  arguments.
2Development  Community  (SADC),  was  formed  to provide  a united  fiont  aganst South  Afica. The
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC)  was  created  in part  in rsponse to the potential  threat  of regional
powers  such  as Iran  and Iaq.  And  a major  motive  of Cental and Eastem  European  coitries for
applying  for  membership  to the EU  is as  protection  against  the perceived  threat  from  Russia
Third, security  threats  between  neighboring  countries  may move them to form RIAs.
Examples  of this motivation  are said to include  the creation  of the Euopean Coal and Steel
Community  (ECSC,  1951)  and the Eupean  Economic  Community  (EEC,  1957)  to reduce  the
thra  of war in Europe  (see  the quote  of Jean  Monnet  at the start  of the paper),  ASEAN  to reduce
tesion  betweer  Inonesia and  Malaysia,  and MERCOSUR  to reduce  tensions  between  Argentina
and Brazi (see Bastian,  1996). Page (1996)  suggests  that this element  is also found  in the
fiomation  of  APEC  and  the CACM  which  include  potential  political/military  opponents.
This paper explores  this last case-the use of regional  trade agrements as a route to
rapprochemett  between  antagostc  staes. Our  pupose is not  to advance  this argument,  although
we shall  brefly consider  the case  that has  been  made  for  it, but rther to subject  it to a measure  of
fiomal  scutiny. Thus  we  shall  take  at fice value  the claim  that  an RIA  reduces  the  tenion between
potenial enemies  and ask  wat  implications  this has for  the form  and evolution  of the  agreement
Our purpose  is twofold. First, if we accept  the hypothess-sy,  on the basis of statmts  by
politicians-we  would  be able  to make  predictions  about  the development  of regional  integration
mad  thus possibly  to comment  on issues  such  as whether  or not it is a stepping  stone  towards
multiatealsm.
Second,  and more inteestngly, the implications  we derive provide  a set of testable
predictions  which  would  potentially  allow  us to test  whethe or not particular  RIAs  have  stemmed
3fiom  this form of security  motive. We say "potentially"  because  we recognize  that in practice  RIAs
are likely to arise and evolve from a combinaton of forces which my  offset the effects of the
political  motivation.  Nonetheless,  if our predictions  are rejected  we may  at least  refuite  the assertion
that security  was the only or even the main motivation  behind  an RIA.
The rmainder of the paper is organized  as follows. Section 2 explores the argment  that
integation fosters security  and in Section 3 this is transated into a formal  model. The solution  is
provided in Section 4 (under symmetry in Secdon 4.1 and under asymmetry  in Section 4.2). The
relationsip between deep intgrtion  and optimm  extmal trade policy  is examined-in  Section  5.
Exogenous  deep integration  is analyzed  in Section  5.1 and endogenous  deep  integration  in Section
5.2.  Dynamic aspects are examined in Section 6.  Bloc enlargment and domino effects are
examined  in Section  7. Section 8 concludes  and Section  9 discusses  possible  extensions.
The model provided in  this paper abstcts  from defense as an altemative meas  of
providing  security. This issue is on our reseach agenda,  however,  see Section  9 for a discussion  of
this and other  possible  extmsions.
2. Trade amd  Security 4
The notion of trade as a civilizing influence  is an old one-see Hirschman  (1982).  The
notion that international  trade is a means of diffing  tension  and bnngng nations  together  is also
venerable. The nineteeth  century British politician  Richard  Cobden peristently advocated  that
Britain should  trade freely with her neighbors  as a means of convincing  them of the advantages  of
free trade and also as a means of locking them more fully into the community  of nations. In the
4 We ae  grateftul  to Doug  Irwin  for suggestions  on this  section,  but he should  not be held  responsible
for its shortcomings.
4twentieth  century  Cordell  HulL  US Secretay of St  (1933-44)  and in some  wy  the ahtct  of
the post-war interntonal  tadig  order, advocad  this view trughout  his publc  hfe.  IHs
auiogra  contai  homely stories of trade reconn  waing  neighbors  along with
discussions  of inenatnl  strtegy-Hull (1948,  e.g.,  p. 364  and  p. 84,  respectively).
While tade as a reconcile"  seems  a neceay  npining for  "rgioalim  as security,"
it is  not really  sufficet  Both  Cobden  and  Hull  aso eyxpssd a stog  fith inin
Thus,  while the Cobden-Chevaler  Treaty of 1860 bdween Frce  and Britin was bilateral,
Cobden's  concepdon  was  muilateal  and  the Tty  itself  contined  an unconditional  MFN  clase.
Hull  ws  explicit  that trade  dion  bred  tnions  rathr ta  diffiised  them  (Hull,  1948,  p.
81,  p. 363).'
To obtain  an advocacy  for regionaism  on secty  grounds  one must tun to continenta
Europe. Wilfiedo  Pareto appaeny  agued in 1889  th  -customs  unions ...[were]...  a meas  to
better  political lions  and  eveul  pi  on"  (Machlup,  1977,  p.  41)  and  Robert  Schuman  and
Jean  Monnet-the  founding  fh  of the EEC-were  explicit  that  the ECSC  was  to make  Franco-
Geman war  not only  "unhinkable,  but matrially impossible"  (see  Swamn,  1992,  p. 6). Monet
also agued that while  Britain,  the United SUates  and tie USSR  coud witdraw into thdr own
speres, France  and Genmany  wee  inexticably  linkod  and had no alteative  than to solve  the
"Eurpean  problem."  Thus  his  more  regional  focus  was,  pe  ul
Lat  echoes  of bnnt's  views  are common.  For  eaample,  Dr. Walter  Hallsoen,  a fomer
preident of the EC Commission,  put it clearly  when  he stated We  are not in buiness at all; we
'Hull advocated  the principle  of unconditional  mfn,  which  in  US  usage  implies  offering  mfh  triffs to any
country  offering  mfin  to the United  States. That is, it continues  to permit  discrimination  against  those
"outside  the system."
5are in politics (see Swann,  1992,  p. ix) And Jones (1993),  referring  to Frace  and Geamany,  states
that "Some trading blocs may be advocated  prmarily to avoid military conflicts' (p. 83). 6 7
Hirschman  (1981, Chapte  12) makes a similaw  point, though he argues that the EC may have
arrived  a bit late.
Security and other "non-economic"  aspects of RIAs also seem  to have played  a role in the
Soutern  Cone. Argentina  and Brazil signed nuclear cooperation  and econmic ageemes  (e.g.,
in the area of capital goods and automobiles)  in the mid-1980s,  quite possibly hoping that the
removal  of extera  tensions  would allow each to reduce the power of the military  and stengthen
its fagle  democacy.  The creaton of Mercosur  in 1991 cornimned  this process and  bound smaLer
neighboring  counines into it  The political effctiveness of Mercosur  is sometimes  held to be
proven by recent rumors that a posable coup in Paraguay  was laid to rest following  a pointed
reaffimation by the presidents  of the four member counties - based on a clause in the Treaty of
Asuncion  establishing  Mercosur  -that democracy  was a necessary  condition  for membersbip  in the
bloc (Survey  on MERCOSUR,  The Economist, October 12, 1996). While  this appears  persusive
evidence  of the link between  RIAs and politics,  it is not beyond dispute  that such conct  action
depended  wholly on the exstence of Mercosur,  or that expion  from the RIA rather than some
6Jones  (1993)  also argues  that, since  open markets  imply  a loss  of national  control  over the economy,
countries  may  prefer to form RIAs  with 'like-minded'  neighbors. In other  words,  the issue  of cultual
externalities  may influence  the decision  on forming a RIA as well as th  choice of parter.  For
instance,  one reason  that is sometimes  advocated  for why a number  of North  African  countries  have
chosen  to form  RIAs  with  the EU rather  than  liberalize  unilaterally  is that  the latter  would  subject  them
to open  competition  with  Asia  and  possibly  threaten  their lifestyle. The analysis  provied in this  paer
applies  to cultural  externalities  as well.
7Nowe  that  Switzerland,  which  found  an alternative  way to generate  security,  namely  through  neutlity,
has so far  been  reluctant  to  join the EU.
6other snction was the critical  thrat  Thus at least  a measure  of caution  should  be exercised  in
interpreting  this  expeene.
Srinivasan  (1994)  argues  that integration  might  contribute  to reducing  tensons in South
Asia. He states  that "It is conceivable  that promoting  freer  movement  of goods,  services,  people
and capital  in the regon might  also  facilitae  the resolution  of ;olitical  and  tenntcrial  disputes"  (p.
7).
Political  scientists  have  also  discussed  the  use of trade  diplomacy  within  a regional  ont,
including  whether  and what  tpe  of RIAs might  raise  welfine  of the member  coes  through
"intra-mural  conflict  avoidance  and mas  "  Bastian  (1996)  argues  that trade  negoiations
between  leaders  of neighboring  countries  are likely  to result  in a higher  degree  of trust between
them. He mentions  that RIAs  may enable  "...political  and/or  economic  elites  to form  coalitions
for subsequent  collaboration  and cons  _sual  action",  and that they may a...  carry their own
language  and discourse,  thus  being  able  to sociaize the partcipants,  e.g.,  when  talkdng  about  a
'region'."  Mansfield  (1992)  also recognizes  the importance  of security  extemalities  in trade
relations. However,  he argues  that countries  will lower barris  with those  who belong  to the
same  alliance  (e.g.,  NATO)  because  the inreased trade will raise incomes  which  can then be
used to raise  defense  expenditures;  the latter is only beneficial  if done  between  allies,  not with
adversares. Contrary  to Mansfield,  we assume  that tho very  action  of trading  generates  security
benefits,  irrespective  of any income  effects. Moreover,  Mansfield's  analysis  is weakeed by the
a Note also that the preservadon  of democracy  in a member  country  is a somewhat  different  politl
payoff from the alleviation  of iter-member coiflict that we are primarily  inest  in, thou
democradc  regmies  may contbue  to scurity by reducing  i-member  conflict  tough  inceased
tade (Polachdek  1996).
7assumption  that lowering  trade  barriers  towards  allies  generates  income  gains,  since,  in fact,  the
impact of trade prefrences  on income is ambiguous  (second  best).
Evidence  on the impat  of trade on the likelihood  of conflict between  any pair of
countries  is limited. A large  number  of studies  in the political  science  literature  have  confirmed
the results  of Chan  (1984)  that conflict  is less prevalent  between  any two counties if both are
democratic. Polachek  (1992, 1996)  explains  this finding  through  the effect  of democracy  on
trade. He finds that democraces  trade mote with  each othr  than other countries,  and - using
detailed  data  from  the Conflict  and Peace  Data  Bank  -finds  a significant  and negative  impact  of
trade  on conflict He  obtains  an elasticity  of his  measure  of conflict  with  respect  to trade  of -0.  15
to -0.19. One  question  is the direcdon  of causality,  i.e., wheter confict reduces  trade  or trade
reduces  conflict Polacek toste  this by means  of three-stage  least squares,  and found  that the
tade  variable remained statistically  significant and became empirically  more important
(elasticity  of -0.30)  in the conflict  equation  while  the conflict  variable  was not significant  in the
trade equation. The causality  results  were confimed  by Granger  causaity tets (Gasiorowsi
and Polachek  1982).
Before  turig  to the modeL  we  should  note  that  this  paper  refers  lgely,  if not  exclusively,
to RIAs  in a geogrphic sense,  or to what Ethier  (1996)  has caLled  "regional  regionalism".  This
definition  would seem  to cover  most RIAs  since  they are geneally formed  among  neighborig
countrie  Examples  include  the EU, Mercour,  the Andean  Pact,  the CACM,  NAFTA,  ASEAN's
AFIA, SAFMA,  the GCC,  ECOWAS  and SADC. Our  analysis  is thus  of potental  relevance  for
the mority of RIAs.
83. The Model
Assume three  countries  (1, 2 and ROW)  and  three  nomnal  goods (A, B and R). Country 1
produces  good A, Country  2 produces good  B, and ROW (the rest of the world)  produces  goods A,
B and R. The production,  consumption  and trade  patterns  are shown  in Table 1.
We abstract  from optimal  taxation  issues  related  to economic  power on the world  market in
order to focus exclusively  on matters of security and trade diplomacy. 9 Hence, we assume that
Counties 1 and 2 are small and that the world prices PA,  PB*  and Pe  (of goods A, B and R,
respecdvely)  they  face  are determined  in ROW.
Table 1. Production,  Trade and Consumption  Pattern
Production  Export  Import  Consumption
Country  1A  A  B, R  A, B, R
Country  2  B  B  A, R  A, B, R
ROW  A, B,R  R  A, B  A, B, R
Without  loss of generlity, units of A, B and R are selected  such that PA*  = PB*  = PR - 1.
Denote consumer prices of goods A, B and R in Country i ( i =  1, 2) by PA', PB' and Pr,
respectively. Assume  a representative  consumer  Ii in Country  i, whose  consumption  of goods  A, B
and R is denoted  by Al, B, and R 1 , and with utility
9  See Krugman  (1991)  for an analysis  of custom  unions' optimal  common  extenal tariffs  associated
witi market  power.
9(1) U,  = X(A;,  B;,  Ri  )+ Z; (SIQ; i = 1, 2,
XN,A'>O,  X2,Zj"<O, Xj  (=0)=o,  Xj  Ma  = Aj, Bi,  BR,),
with U 1 twice continuously  differentiable. The assumption  Xj (-0)  = c  (j = A,, Bi, Rj)
ensures  intenal equilibrium  in the sense that Counties 1 and 2 trade both with each other  and with
the ROW  no matter  what taxes and/or  subsidies  are applied.
SK; denotes the level of security in Country i associated  with trust in the neighboring
country,  or the level of 'security  capital' in Country  i.  The assumption  is that utility increases  at a
decreasing  rate as the level of security increases. Security  SK, is a public  good which I; tkes  as
given  when maximizing  U;.
The welfare  impact  of incorporating  a public good SK;  (social  capital)  in the utility function
was examined in the case of labor mobility in Schiff (1992) and in the case of intional
migration  in Schiff  (1996b). Becker  (1996) and Bliss (1994)  also assume  that social capital  enters
the utility fimction. Note that security  capital SK, could have been incorporated  in the production
functions  for goods A and B rather than (or as well as) in the utility fimction. The reason for
incorporating  security  in the production  function is that a lower  degree  of security  implies  that more
resources  must be devoted  to security  matters and fewer  are available  for the production  of goods A
and B. This approach  is taken in Schiff (1996c)  which examines  the impact  of policy reform  under
ethnic  diversity.
Assume  Country  i's only endowment  is labor  Li (i = 1,  2).  Total  output  A (B) in Country 1
(2), and which  equals  national  income Y, (Y 2) measured  at world  prices,  is
10(2)Y 1 =A=aLj,Y 2=B=bL 2;  a,b>O,
withpercapitaincomeyl=  a and Y2= b.
We refer below  to Countries  1 and 2 as partners whether  or not they are formally  members
of a RIA.  Assume  that an increase  in home country imports from the partner raises the home
country's knowledge  of and trust in the parter  and reduces  the level of insecurity  in the home
county.  In other words,  importng from the partner country  increases  intction  with individuals
in the parter  country,  raises the level of information  about them, and increases  the level of trust
and security in the home country.1 0 Equivalently,  larger home country  imports  from the partner
raises the imporunce of the home country  as a market for partner  exports  and, given  the inreased
cost of klling the goose that lays the golden egg, lowers  the likelihood  of a security  threat by the
partner  country.
Assune that the level of security in the home country  falls as the partner's  relative  income
increases  becuse  it implies a greater relative power for the partner and thus a larger potential
security  threat for the home country. Assume also that the higher  the partner's  relative  income,  the
greater  the home country's  security  gains from additional  imports  from  the partner. Thus,
(3) SKI  = SK (B 1l, Y 2/Y 1); SK 2 = SK (A 2, YN/Y 2)11,
9 Note  that  in this  setup,  the level  of home  coutry imports  of the partner's  good  equals  the  level  of home
county consumption  of the partner's good (since it is not produced  in the home  country).
11  In fact, SK depends  on total (rather than on I 's per capita) imports  from the partner, so that the term
Li should  be included  in the equation. Excluding  it does not affect  the model's solution  (though  it matters
in the case of population  changes,  as noted  below) and is done for notational  simplicity.
11with SKI  twice continuously  differentiable,  SKI (SK2)  ineing  in B, (A 2) and deceasing
in Y2/YI (Y,/Y2),  stricty concave,  and with aSK,'/8(Y 2/Yl) > 0, aSK2'/a(Y,Y2) > 0 (where SKI'
(SK2') - 8SK,/8B 1(MSK 2/aA2)). The latter  implies  that the security beefits fiom import from the
part  incease as the partner's relative  income  increases.
4. Solution
Initviduals I,  maxmim U;  with emspect  to Ai, B 1 and  R  subject  to the budget  constaint Y,  =
PA,AI  + PB'  B, + PR'  R, and taking SK; as given  exogenously  (i =1,  2).  The first-order  conditions
are
(4)  XA'/XR  = PA/ PR',  XB'IXR  = PB'/  PR'; XjauoX/8 (i - 1,2; j=  A, Bi,  RP.
n te  absence  of domestic  ortrade  xes in Countries  I and 2, Pji  = p* = I (i = 1, 2; j =  A,
B3,  RJ),  and individual  I,'s utility  maximization  implies
(5) XAIXR'  = XB  = I  .
Even though Country 1 (2) is small, the absence of  domestic or trade taxes does not
maximize  welfare  because of the exmralities associated  with the impact  of imports  B, (A2)  from
Country  2 (1) on SKI (SK2). A policy  of zero  trade and domestic  taxes maximizes  national  income
L1X-, i.e., it maximizes  the part of weLfar W; = LI.U,  which depends  directly  on the consumption
12of goods and services.  However,  welfare depends on national income L 3.X 1 as well as on the
benefits  from security  L1.71. Individual  utility maximization  is based on the assumption  that  oX/8j
= MU/oj  for Vj, while social  welfare  maximization  recognizes  that  8X/8J  <  U/A forj = B1, A 2, with
the home country's social gain from imports from the partner larger than the private gain by the
impact  on security.
It is well known that welfare  maximization  requires  distortions  to be attacked  at the source
(Bhagwati 1987),  and policy should result in the intemalization  of the extemalities. In this case,
since SK is a function of imports, welfare W; = L1.U, in the home country is maimized with a
subsidy  Si on imports  from the patner country  (assumed  to be financed  thomugh  lump  sum taxation)
equal to
(6) Si = Li.Zi'.SKi'/.  = Li.Zi'.SKi'/XR';  i = 1, 2,
where  A;  is the marginal utility of income.  Note that  =  X/P*  = X3',  the maginal  utility
of R  Note also that  the optimum  subsidy  Si is equal  to the optimum  subsidy  rate defined  as a share
of the world price (since PA*  = PB  = 1). Note also that Si need not increase  with Li because Y,
ixcreases  with Li  (equation  (2)), and SK,' falls  with an increase  in Y; (equation  (3)).
Since Countries 1 and 2 continue  to trade with the ROW following  the import  subsidy Si
(see equation  (1)), producer  prices  in Countries  1 and 2 are not affected  by the import  subsidy. The
only effect  is to lower  the consumer  price of imports  from  the partner.
This is shown for Country I in Figure 1 where all quantities  are in per capita terms.




(P2 )OPT  T--=  ---
0  BP B p  B4s'social' demand  curve  DBS  (i.e., the social value)  is the sum  of the private  value and  the value of the
extraity  L,.Z,'.SKI'/XR'  = L,.Z,'.SK 1'/X,.  Following  the strict concavity  assumptions  made in
equations  (1) and (3), the vertical distance between  the two demand curves falls with Bl.  Private
equilibrium  in the absence  of interventions  is at point  E, where  XB'/XR'  = PB*/Pt*  = 1, and imports
equal to BIP.  The social optinum is at point F, where  (XBe  + LI.Z,'.SK')/XR1  = PB*IPR*  = 1, and
imports  equal to B,S. This solution is obtained  with a subsidy  on imports  of good B from Country
2 equal to S, = Ll.Z,'.SK,'/XR' = L,.Z,'.SK,'/X,.  This is shown in Figure 1 by the line PBI,  the
consumer  price of good B in Country 1 - obtined as the world price PB*  minus the import  subsidy
(or PB*  - S, = I - S,) - and which intersects  the private  demand  curve  D 8 r at point G, with subsidy
S, = FG and imports  B,S.
The relative  consumer  prices following  imposition  of the subsidy  rate S,  are:
1  x  - y  _  2/P  2 -2/P  2-1 (7)  PA  /PR1  =  , PBI/PR'=  I  1,  PA PR  =1 -S2, PB PR 
As can easily be veified, the same relative  price  configurtion as the one obtained  with the
subsidy  rate Si  onpartner imports  can be obtinedwith ataxrate T;  = S-/(l - S) on imports  from the
ROW and on consumption  of the home good (with  the tax returned in lump sum fashion). Thus,
welfare of Country  i (i = 1, 2) is maximized either with a subsidy rate S, on imports from the
partner,  or altenatively, by Countries 1 and 2 forming  a RIA with a tax rate on imports  from the
ROW of T, = S-/(I -S;) and an equal tax rate on consumption  of the home  good.
Note that even if the tax is imposed exclusively  on imports from the ROW and not on
consumption  of the home good, there is a positive  tax smaller  than T; at which  welfare is higher
14than in the absence  of interventions,  though welfare is lower  than with the optimim  subsidy Si or
with the optimum  tax T; applied to both imports from the ROW and to consumption  of home
goods.
The impact  of the optimum  intervention  on per capita income and welfiLre  can be seen in
Figure 1 (measured  in currency  units). Benefits from security  Z, increase  by area EGFK, income
XI falls by area EFG, and welfire U 1 rises by area EFK. Note that since the security  extenality
falls as imports  increase,  area EFK is larger than area EFG. The income  loss for Country 1 from
the RIA can be  appr  ma  by S 1
2.BB.ss/2PBI,  whee  B is the elasticity  of demand  for good B in
Country 1. Thus, S1 2.BI.sBn2PB 1, the income loss measured  as the loss from the RIA relative to a
free trade situation,  provides  a lower bound of the welfiare  gain EFK generated  by the optimum
intervention.
4.1. Symeryn
Under  symmetry  between  Countries  I and 2, LA  = LB  L, a = b, YA  = YB.  and Zl = Z2  Z-.
Since  U is symmetric  in A and B, B  = A2 ,  SKA  = SKB  m  SK,  and  UA = UB  = XXM,  KR)  +
Z[SK(M 1)],  with
(8) SI = S2 a  S = L.Z'.(oSK/MY/XR=  L.Z'.(8SK/8M)/;.
Thus, under  symmetry,  welfare  of Countries  1 and 2 is maximized  either  with a subsidy  rate
equal to S on imports  from the partner, or with the formation  of a customs  union (CU) between
15Countries 1 and 2 with common  extemnal  tariff rate CET = S/(1-S)  and with a tax rate T = CET on
consumption  of the home  good.
Note also that in the symmetric  case, trade between the partners  is balanced  and so is their
trade with the ROW. This is not necessarily  the case under  asymmetry.
4.2.  Asymnetry
Assume symmetry  between  Countries  1 and 2, but with one exception:  for any SK 1 = SK 2,
Z2' > Zl'.  n other words, increasing  security is more important  in Country  2  an in Country  1.
This may be due to the fact that Country  1  has a stronger  tendency  to resort  to aggression  to resolve
disagreements  or that Country  2 suffered  more in previous wars han Counry 1.12 The equlibrium
in tie previous  subsection  would  no longer  be sustainable  because  Country  2 now desires  a subsidy
S2 >  SI (see equation  (6)). In other words, the optimum subsidy  for Country  2 - the country  with
the stronger  security  concerns  - is larger  than that of Country 1.
Altematively,  Countries  1 and 2 can maximize  welfare  by forming  a FTA with a tax rate T 1
=  S-/(I  - S.) on imports  from the ROW and on consumption  of the home good,  and with T2 > TI.'3
Thus, optumum  taiffs  on imports from the ROW are higher for the country with the stronger
security  concems. Note that with  S2 > SI, B, < A 2. Thus, at the social optimum,  Country  1 runs a
trade surplus  with Country  2 and a deficit with the ROW (and vice versa  for Country  2).  In other
words, at the social optimum,  the country  with stronger security concems  imports  more from its
partner.
12  For instance,  France  may  have  been  more  concerned  with  security  than  Germany  in the first  half of
the 20th  century  while  the opposite  may  have  been  true in Napoleonic  times.
13  The  FTA requires  rules  of origin  to prevent  deflection  of R from  Country  1  to Country  2.
16This is shown in Figure 1.  Country 2's private demand curve DAP  is identical to DBP.
However,  the 'social' demand  curve for Country  2 is DAS  > DBs,  and the price fimction  PA2  (equal
to the world price minus the optimum  subsidy  function  S2)  intersects  the demand  curve  at point J.
The subsidy  S2= HJ > SI  = FG, and B1< A 2.
Alternatively,  assumne  symmetry  between  Countries  1 and 2 except  for Y, > Y 2. This may
be due either because a > b, LI > L2 or both (equation  (2)).  Assume a > b and LI = L2. From
equation (3), 82SK1/aB,a(Y2/Y1 ) > 0 and 82SK 2/8A 28(Y/Y2) > 0.  Thus, SK 2' > SKI' for A2 = B 1
(i.e., for the same level of imports from the partner). In other words, the marginal impact of
imports  from the partner  on home country  security  is larger for Country  2 than  for Country  1. This
would imply S2  > SI. On the other hand,  the marginal  utility of income X1  <  X2  since  yi > y2(i.e.,
the demand for security  increases  with per capita income and is thus larger in Country  I than in
Country  2), implying  S 2 < Sl. Thus, whether  S2 is larger or smaller  than SI  depends  on wheher the
first or second effect is larger.
If Y, > Y 2 is due to the fact that LI > L2 (with a = b),  thethe  first reason for S2  > SI
mentioned  in the previous  paragraph  continues  to holds,  but the second one does not since Yi  = y2.
Thus, S2> SI in this case.
Note that in both the symmetric  and asymmetric  cases, the welfare  of both Countries  1 and
2 would also be maximized  if one of them applied the optimum subsidy on imports from the
partner  while the other  applied  the optimum  tax on imports  from the ROW and on consumption  of
the home good. The formation  of a RIA (CU or FTA) would require coordination  to ensure  that
both Countries 1 and 2 applied the tax. If we added to the model the assumption  that policy
coordination  provided  additional  security  benefits  by improving  trust and understanding  among  the
17leaders  (and negotiators)  of both countries  (see the quote from Bastian 1996  in Section  2), then a
RIA (accompanied  by appropriate  domestic  taxes) would  be superior  to subsidies  on imports  from
the partner, and welfare maximizing governments  in Countries 1 and 2 would coordinate  their
policies. On cooperative  solutions,  see Section  8 (Extensions).
What has been shown so far is that, in the presence  of security  extemalities,  the formation
of a RIA provides an optimum (though not the only one).  In what follows, we examine the
implications  of the formation  of such an optimum  RIA for the evolution of extemal tarffis over
time as well  as following  deep integration  and enlargement.
The issue of whether Countries 1 and 2 are symmetric  or asymmetrc has no significant
imnpact  on results in the renainder of the paper. Unless noted otherwise,  symmetry is assumed
below.
5. Trade  Preferences  and Deep Integration
It is often argued  that the focus on the static  second-best  aspects  of regional  integation may
be misplaced and that gains can be expected from deep integration,  including  hrmonimtion of
technical standards  and of investment  codes, and general facilitation  of movement  of goods and
factors. Deep integration is expected to result in lower real trading costs and welfare gains for
member  countries." 4 A recent  example  is EC-92  which  resulted  in lower  barriers  on intra-EC  trade.
The impact  of EC-92 has been estimated  by Smith and Venables  (1988), Baldwin (1989),  Smith
(1992),  and Harrison  et al. (1996a).
24  However,  welfare  gains are by no means  certain  if RIAs  are not optimal  since lowering  internal
trading  costs  may  in principle  result  in ixmriserization.  This  cannot  occur  in our model.
18An unresolved  question is: Are regional  trade preferences  necessary  for or supportive  of
deep integation  on  a  regional basis? The relationship between deep integration and trade
prefces  is examined  in the case of exogenous  deep integration  in Section  5.1 and in the case of
endogenous  deep integration  in Section 5.2.
5.1. Exogenous  Deep  Integation
Assume initially  that trade with the ROW involves  the same trading costs C as intra-bloc
trade. Following  deep  integration,  the trading cost for intra-bloc  trade falls  to C0 < C while trading
costs with the ROW remain unchanged  at C.  Since  trade with the ROW continues  following  deep
integration  (see equation (1)), producer prices in Countries 1 and 2 are not affected by deep
integration,  but consumer  prices in the home country  for goods imported  from the partner (BI in
Country  1 and A2 in Country  2) fal by an amount  C - C 0. Consequety,  consumption  (= imports)
of B 1 and A2 ises.  Given that Z",  SK' < 0 (equations  (1) and (3)), the optimum  subsidy Si falls
(equation  (6)).
A reduction  in trading costs means that the PB*  line in Figure 1 shifts downwards  and the
intersection  point E (of the PB line and the private demand curve D)  shifts  to the right, and
similarly  for the intersection  point F (of the PB line  and the 'social' demand  cuve  DB3). Since  the
distance  FG = SI falls  as B 1 increases,  the optimum  subsidy  falls.
Equivalently,  lower  tading costs on intra-bloc  trade  imply lower  optimum  taxes on trade
with the ROW and on consumption  of home goods. Thus, in the case  of exogenous  deep
integration  within  the region,  trade preferences  and deep  integration  are substitutes:  lower  intra-bloc
19trading  costs imply lower  optimum  trade preferences.
5.2.  Endogenous  Deep  Integration
Altematively,  assume that lowenng tade  barriers  on inta-bloc trade is costly and that the
cost is negatively  related  to the level of tust  or security  capital  SK. Since  trust is positively  related
to imports  from the partner, a larger volume of such imnports  reduces  the cost of deep intgrtion
and is thus likely  to result in more  deep integration  and in lower  unit trading  costs on trade with the
partner.
Haas (1958),  saw increased  trade among  members  of the EC-6  as having  a positive  impact
both in the area of international  politics and of deep integration. He wrote (p. 311) that "... it is
inconceivable  that the liberaliztion not only of trade but of the conditions  governing  trade can go
on for long without '"armoniation  of general economic  policies" spilling  over into the fields of
curency and credit ...The spill-over  may make a political  community  of Europe  ..."
We examine two altemative cases.  In the first one, deep integration  takes place every
period. In the second  one, deep integration  takes place  once and for all. Assume  unit tading costs
C on imports  from  the partner  are
(9) C = C[SKM)], 8C/aM  = (BC/8SK).SK'  < 0,
where  M is the volume  of imports  from the parter (and M = BI = A 2 under  symmetty).
In this  case,  there are two  sources  of positive  extemalities  -rather  thaone  -associated  with
imports from the partner. Individual  Ii who imports from the partner  generates  an extenality in
20terms of additional  secunty. And additional  secunty raises  utility directly  (equation  (1)) as well as
indirectly  by lowering  the unit cost of intra-bloc  trade.  The total trading cost TC on imports  M
from the parter  and the marginal  social cost of tading MSC are
(10) TC = M.C[SK(M)],  MSC  = C.(I + £), E  - (OC/8).(MC)  < 0.
Individual  I; takes  the private  cost C of importing  from the parter  into account  but not his
negative  effect  on unit costs s.C. The optimum  subsidy  SE  is
(I 1) SE = Z .(oSK/&v)/  -£;.C  > S,
with S defined  in equation  (8).
Equivalently,  the optimum  is obtained  with a common  extenal tariff CETE  = SE/(I  - SE) >
CET = S/(1 -S) and  a tax on home  consumptionTE  = CETE>  T = CET.
Altmeatively,  assume  that if deep integration  takes  place, it does so at a given  point in time
(e.g., in 1992 for EC-92)  and is pemmanent.  For instance,  assume  that trust and security  SK 1 do not
depend  on the flow  of current intra-bloc  trade but on past flows as well (see Section  6 on that) and
that deep integration  will take place  when SK; is sufficiently  large and the cost of deep integration
is  sufficiently low.  Tlen,  since increased intra-bloc trade generates extenalities in terms of
lowering the cost of future deep integration,  the optimum  subsidy on intra-bloc  trade (or optim
CET) is higher before  deep integration. However,  once deep integration  has taken  place and intra-
bloc trading  costs  have  fallen,  the optimum  subsidy  (or optimum  CET) is lower.
21Thus, if the cost of deep integration  is unrelated  to the degree of trust between  Countdes 1
and 2, not only are trade preferences  not required  in order  to implement  deep integration  measures
but deep integration  actually  implies  a reduction  in optimum  trade preferences. On the other hand,
if deep integration  vanishes  every period and its cost declines  with the degree  of security  and trust,
optimum trade preferences  are larger. And if deep integration  takes place once and for all and is
permanent, optimum trade preferences  are higher before deep integration  takes place and lower
thereafter.' 5
6. Dynamics
The EC has reduced  its extenal trade  barriers  on manu  ing products  with respect  to the
ROW over time. Average  tariffs on manufacturing  products  have fallen  from about 13%  in 1958  to
about 3% after the Uruguay  Round."  Similarly,  developing  countries  forming  RIAs in the 1960s
imposed high extenal trade barrers while recent RIAs and new incamations  of old RIAs have
tended to impose lower external  trade barriers. Is this gradual  reduction  of extemal trade barriers
over time predicted  by our model  of regional  integration?
So far, security  capital  SK has been  assumed  to depend  on the current  flow of imports  from
the partner. In other words,  SK has been assumed  to depreciate  fully at the end of each  period. In
l' Of course,  there are different  degrees  of deep  integration,  and though  the 'first' degree  (say, EC-92)
occurs  once and for all, it may be followed  by a 'second' degree  of deep integration  (say, monety
union). The inplications  for the evolution  of external  trade barriers is ambiguous  in this case.  It
depends  on the 'production  functions'  of the later degrees  of deep integration.  If, as seems  plausible,
the marginal  product  of the sum of the early degrees  of deep integration  in the production  of later
degrees  of deep integration  rises  with  the degree  of deep  integration,  and the marginal  product  of intra-
bloc trade falls with the degree  of deep integration,  then  optimum  external  trade barriers  fall as the
degree  of deep  integration  increases.
16 Note that the reduction  in the EC's external  trade barriers  over time has taken place  despite  the
increase  in the number of member  countries  from six to fifteen, i.e., despite the increase  in the
optimum  CET level  based  on market  power  considerations.
22fact,  though,  SK (trust  and goodwill)  depends  not only on current  behavior  but on past behavior  as
well.  In other words, it does not depreciate  entirely  at the end of every period. Assume that the
level of SKt at time t depends on the curet  flow of imports  from the partner  and on SKt. 1 at t-1,
with a rate of depreciation  of SK equal to 8 < 1. Expressing  variables  in continuous  time, equation
(3) becomes,  under  symmetry,  the law of motion  (3'):
(3') SK =FM)  - 8.SK; 8 <1,
where SK m  aSK/at is the time derivative  of SK, F(M) is the curent gross addition  to the
stock of security capital (with F' > 0), and the subscript 't'  on SK and M has been deleted to
simplify  notation. Since Y2/Y, = YIN2 = 1 under symmetry,  the terms have been omitted from
equation  (3').
Start  at SK = 0. As SK increases,  its marginal  utility  Z' falls (equation  (1)). If governments
are myopic  and choose S to maximize  current  welfare  W = L.U in each period,  then from equation
(6), S falls over time. However,  optimizing  govemments  will also take into account  the impact  of
current  subsidies  on the level of SK and thus on future  welfare.
Assume  the governments  of Countries  1 and 2 select  an optimum  time path for the subsidy
S on  imports from the partner in order  to maxmize V, the present  value of W= L.U.
The Hamiltonian  is
(12) H = W(SK,  S, t) + q. SK (SK, S, t),
23where q is the marginal  value of SK, WVmA/oSK,  where  VmAx  is the maximum  value of V
obtained  with the optimum  path  for S.  The solution  (or maximum  principle)  is
(l3a) 8Haq  = SK = F(M)  -8.SK (equation  (3')),
(13b) 8W8S  = 8W/8S  + q.(aSKI8S) = O, and
(13c)  8W8SK  = 8W/ASK  + q.(aSK/8SK) = - q.
From equation (13a), aSKIaS  = (aSKlaM).(M/aS)  > 0.  Thus, from equation  (13b),
MW/MS  < 0.  Why is 8W/oS  < O? If a govemment  myopically  maxdmized  current welfare  without
regard for future welfare,  it would choose a subsidy  level Sw so that aW/oSw = 0. However,  an
increase  in the subsidy  also genertes future  welfare  gains  because it raises  M and thus raises  SK
Thus, the subsidy Sv which maximizes V is larger than the myopic Sw which maximizes W.
Consequently,  8W/8S  < 0 at the optimum.
Assume SK is low (say following a series of wars, e.g., in the  1950s for France and
Germany)  so tbat SK rises with imports  M > 0 between  the two partns  (equation  (13a))  and the
value  of SK falls, i.e., q < 0.  From equation  (13b),  a reduction  in q over time implies  that 8W/OS
fills over time in absolute value or becomes  less negative  since aSKloS  falls with SK as well in
absolute  value. 17 In other words, along its optimum  path, Sv falls oVer  time and approaches  SW.
17 asKlas  =  '(asK1asK).(asKI).(MIas)  =  -8.(aSKI8M).(&M/aS).  The depreciation rate 8 is
constant,  8MM86  is ind  epeneof  SK since U is additive,  and  SK/M * SK' fails with M, so tbat
8SK/aS falls  widt  SK  in absolute  value.
24Note  that S  also  fills as SK  nses  because  the  marginal  im  of SK  on W  fiall with  SK  (Z" < 0).
Equivalently,  the opdmum common  external  tariff CEr  (recal we a  assuming symmetry)  fills
over ime. Note  that the decline  in the CET will stop once a steady  state is attained,  i.e., once
SK=  (equation (3')).
On the ote  hand,  there  may  be times  of crnsis  or rversal where  SK suddenly  falls. TIhe,
the optimum  CET  would  suddenly  iaeb  e grdually sarting to fail againL  If the cisis is
temporary,  with  no impact  on behavior,  CET  eventuay ream  to its previous  steady-stae  value.
On the otber  hd,  a deep  crsis may  affct security  prefenes  or  the Z-funm  in equation  (1)  as
well as the secunty  production  fumtion  in equation  (3), with a pemaent  chge  m optimm
exoteal  barriers.
7.  EnlarSement  and  Domino  Eflht
7. i.  Symmetry
We now examine  the impact  of bloc enklareent on welae  and on the opdmum  CET.
Assume  a fourth  country  (Coutry 3) which  produces  good C, eaot  it to Countis  1, 2 and
ROW,  and  imports  goods  A, B and  R. Country  3 is symmeic with  Coutie  1 and  2. Eah one
of Countries  1,  2 and  3 enjoys  the  same  degee of  trt  (or  sufs  the same  degee of  mistrust)  with
spect  to the  other  two.
Utility  for  individual  I4  in Country  i is now
(I') U,  X(A 1,Bi, Cl,RO+Zi  (SK 1 ; i - 1,  2,
Xj,Z  '>  O, XZE,  A"< 0, Xi U0)  m  X  *  aj(j  - 4  b  Ci,  Rj.
25The  level  of secrity in the home  comtry  is positively  related  to imports  from  both  puter
counties  (and  positively  related  to its relative  income  with  respect  to both),  i.e.,
(3") SKI  = SK  (B 1 , CI); SK 2= SK  (A 2, C2);  SK 3= SK  (A3,  B3),
with  SK symmetic  in both  imports  (and  with  the  relative  icome tems not included  in the
equation  for  simplicity).
Assume  the  ree countries  (Counties 1,  2 and  3) impose  opimum  subsidies  on  trade  with
each  other. Under  symmetry,  each  country  imposes  the same  subidy rate S as the other  two and
imposes  the same  subsidy  on its imports  from both partn  The some esult  is obuined  with a
common  extemal  tariff  rate  CET  = S/(1-S)  and  a tax rate  T - CET  on the  consumption  of the home
First, we note  the  each member  country's welfame  nses when  the RIA expands  from two to
three countries. In the two-country  RIA case, th  optimum  subsidy  is appihed  on the imprts of one
country  only wbile security  benefits are obtained  through imports  from two countries. This case is
equivalent  to a consrained  optimizaion  where  one of the two  subsidies  is set  equal  to zero. The
optimum  in this case rsults  in a  level of welfare  which is necesarily lower than under
unconstraie  optimizaion  in the case of the thre-country RIA, since in the  ter  case all
xtrnalities  associated  with the impact  of imports on security  are intalized.  Consequently,
startng from  a two-member  country  RIA (say,  CountLries  I and 2), there is both a demand  (by
Country  3) and a supply  (by  the RIA members)  for enlargement  In this sense,  there  is a domino
26effect:  if a two-country  RIA  does  exist,  the  third  country  will  join. However,  if no two-country  RIA
exsts, the  tre  countries  have  a  incentive  to form  a RIA  simulta  sly.
We now turn  to the impact  of enlagment on the optimum  CET. Define  the opimum
subsidy  S and optmum  CET  for  a bloc  with  k membes (k - 2, 3) by ek  and CET&,  reectively.
What  is  the relationsbip  between  S2  and  S3 (or  CET and CET3)?  We  show  in the Appendix  that Sk
need not increasme  with  ge,  though e2 <  S3 is likely  to hold on aveage.  This result
gnizes  to S>  <  Sm  for  a bloc  xansion  from m - I to m member  countries  in a woid of m
symmetric  countries  (m  3),  but  not  to  Sl  <  Sk for  a customs  union  ofsi  k (k  < m)  in a wod  of
m symmetic  countries.
In a word of symmetic  blocs  with the optimum  CET  detemined  by maiket  power,  the
CET increases  with enlargement In our modeL  the optmum CET need not icrease with
enagee though  it is likely  to  do so  on avae.
7.2.  y
We  now eamine enagement  ndr  a specific  case  of asymmetry.  Even  thugh the main
security  concem  in the 1950s  in Western  Europe  was with Fne  and Germany,  four  countries
(Belgium,  Nethnds,  Lu  g  and Italy)  joined France  and Germany  to form  the EC-6.
These  four  counties  were smaller  economically  and weaer miitrily.  Simily,  Argetina and
Brazil  decided  in the 1980s  to integrate  their economies,  and Uruguay  and Pguay  -two small
On dmino  effects, se  Baldwin  (1995).
27neighbors  - decided  to join them  and form Mercosur. And  Chile and Bolivia  recty  signed  FrAs
with Mercosur.1 9
Can the present model say anything  about dommo effects in such asymmetric  situations?
Imagine  that Countries  1 and  2 are symmetric  and  are large  compared  to Country  3 (though  they ae
stdll  small economically  compared  to the ROW). Assume  that, given the small size of Country  3,
security in Countries 1 and 2 depends  on the level of trade between them and not on the level of
trade witi Country  3.  Counties I and 2 have  an incentive  to form a RIA. The latter  reduces  the
level of security  in Country  3 becu  Counties 1 and 2 import  less from it. Thus, Country  3 has a
stnger  incentive  to join in a tree-country RIA tan  it did to join with  dther  Country  1 or 2 before
the latter formed a two-country  RLA. On the other hand, Counties 1 and 2 have no incentive  to
allow  Country 3 to join the RIA and Country  3 may have  to offer some compensation  to Counties
1 and 2 in order to be allowed to join.  If the gains to Country  3 from joining are larger than the
losses (if any) to Counties 1 and 2 (say, because  they now trade more with Country 3 and less
among  themselves),  Country  3 will compensate  them and join the RIA.? 0 For a North-South  model
where the developing  country  makes  a side  payment  to the developed  country  in order  to generate  a
RIA,  see Ethier (1996).
19 On a comparson  of the impact  for Chile  of a FrA with  Mercosur  versus  a FTA  with  NAFTA  which
does  not include  security  externalities,  see Harison, Rutherford  and Tarr (1996b),  Schiff  and Sapelli
1996)  and  Schiff  and Ingco  (1996).
In some cases, the gains for Country  3 may be very large.  For instance,  Paraguay  suffered  a
devastating  defeat  in the 1860s  in its war (known  in Spanish  as 'Guerra de la Triple  Alianza')  with a
coalition  made up of Brazil,  Argentina  and Uruguay,  and where  most of its male  population  over 15
years of age perished. Such a collective  memory may provide  a strong  incentive  to avoid future
potential  conflicts.
28S.  Conclusion
This  paper  has examined  a world  in which  regional  trade  agrements  offer  scope  to reduce
security  tensions  between  neighbors Assumning  that security  with  a neighbor  incases  as imports
from  tbat neigbbor  incease,  and making  no assumptions  about  the relative  sizes  of trade  diversion
and  trade  creation,  we  have  shown  tha:
1)  The formation  of a customs  union  (CU)  - ad  by apppiate  domestic xes -
proides an optuum economic  arrangement  under  symmtry, and the sme holds  for  a fiee trade
agreemet (FTA)  under  asymmety;
2) Deep integration  (such as EC-92)  implies lower optimm  extenal tariff  if it is
excogenous,  higher  opmum exmal  tff  if it is endogenous  and vanishes  annually,  and higher
optimum  extenal tarff  before  deep  intgation and lower  ones thereafter  if deep  integmtion  is
edogenous,  take place  once  and  for  all and  is  pmanent;
3)  If the level  of secuity depends  on  current  as well  as past  trade  flows  and  is in stady state
in he absence  oftrade  barriers,  the optimum  extnl  decline  ovrtime; and
4) En  t  of bloc siz (in tems of the number  of simmetrc countries)  implies  higher
welfare,  vwth  an ambiguous  impact  on the optimum  CET  though  it is likely  to be higher,  and  some
form  of domino  effect  easts.
Though  exteralities associated  with security  matters  imply that a RIA may maxim
welfae,  the model  suggests  that  the RIA  is  a transitory  arangement  in the sense  that  optimum  trade
prefernces are highest  at the time  the RIA is formed  (wben  secuity is low)  and tend to decline
over  time. In other  words,  the RIA's  extenal  trade  policy  becomes  inreasingy open  over  time.
299. Extensions
First, our model  abstacts from defense  enditues as an altenative  way to gerate
secuity. This  was  done  for  the sake  of simplicity  and  to avoid  game-theortic  issues  at tis  stage.
We recognize  the importnce of such issues,  which  are on our research  agenda. In the case  of
defense  expnditures,  the cooperative  solution  is clearly  optimal  as the altertve  may be a
prisoner's  dilemma  situation  with large  defense  penditures  (and  not  necessarily  a higher  level  of
security).  In that  case,  the "peace  dividend?  foilowing  formation  of a RIA  may  be substntial  (see
Srinivasan  1994,  p. 7,  for  a discussion  of dtese  issues  in the  case  of  India  and  Pakistan).
Second,  the model assumes  that imports  fiom  - rather  an  trade with - the partner  country
geneates  secuity benefits  in the home  country. Altermatively,  one could  assumne  that  total  trade
(imports  plus  exports)  with  the parter generates  secuity  benefits.  In that case,  RIAs  are likely  to
be superior  to optimum  intra-bloc  trade subsidies. Thue are both game-thoretic  and pracdcal
reasons  for this. First,  each  country  will use a subsidy  to maxmize  national  welfre.  However,
individual  decisions  in  the home  countly  generate  externalities  not only  for  other  individuals  of the
home country  but also for those  of the partner  country  becae  home  country's  imprts are the
paruer's exports. Thus, intra-bloc  trade subsidies  which maximize national welfare generate a
Nash  equilibrium,  with  welfare  and  Nash subsidies  lower  than  in a cooperative  equilibrium  which
could  be obtained  bv forming  a RIA.  Second.  the Nash eauilibrium  implies  subsidies  on both
imports  and exports. Export  subsidies  are GAT-illegal  so that even  the iufeior Nash  solution
cannot  be implemented.  The  superior  cooperative  solution  implicit  in the fonnation  of  a RIA  (with
appropriate  domestic  taxes)  gets  around  this  problemL
30We examine  here dhe  impact  of enargement  on the optimum  subsidy  or CET. Equation
(1') in Section  7.1  can  be rewritten  as
(14)  U = X(A,  B, C, D) + Z[SK(B,  C)],
where  the subscript  'i'  has been deleted  for simplcty.  Without  loss of generality,  we
examine  the issue  from  the viewpoint  of Country  1. Define  Sk  as the optimum  subsidy  in a bloc  of
k counties  (k  = 2,3). From  equation  (14),  we  have
(15)  dU/dS  = [(MXIOA).(dA/dS)  + (OX/OB).(dB/dS)  + (MX1UM.(dC/dS)  + (8X/aR).(dR/dS)]  +
Z'[(SK/aB).(dBtdS)  + (aSK/MC).(dC/dS)].
Note  dtat sine  inome mesured  at world prices, Y, - A = aL, doe  not chae  with  the
subsdy,  and since  all wod  pri  are unity,  balaced trade  implies  dA + dB + dC + dR = 0.
Assme we start  with  S = S3  and apply  it to imports  of both  B and C. Since  e3 is an optimum,
dU/dS  = 0. Given  symmety,  B = C > A - R, OX/BA  - 8XIOR>8MM  - XBuc,  dB/tdS  -dC/dS
-dA/dS  - -dR/dS>  O,  and  .SKM/B  = 2fK/aC. Substituting  these  in equat  (15),  ue have
(16)  dU/dS  - 2(dB/dS).  I(MXUaB  - MX/BA)  + Z'.(aSKaB)]  - 0.
31Altbraively,  assumthat  S = S  3aplies  only to  imports  of B and  the subsidy  on import  of
C is set equal  to zro.  Such  a configration  of subidies is not an optimum,  so dU/dS  o 0. In this
case,  A - C  R < B, dA/dS  dC/dS dR/dS <  O,  dB/dS  = -dAdS -dC/dS  -dR/dS --3(dA/dS),
and dX/8A  = 8X/8C  - 8XU8L Substibing in equation  (15), we have
(17)  dU/dS - (dB/dS).4(Xa/B  - MX/MA)  + Z'.(8SK/8B)]  -(Z'/3).(8SKI/8C).
The objective  is to evalte  dU/tS in equation  (17). If the sign  wer  negative  (positive),
then S would have to be rdced  (increased)  to reach the optimum subsidy  s2 in the two-countty
RIA  case, i.e., then  2  < S3  (S2> S3).
Note the similarities  betwe  equatios (16)  and (17). The  term  r(A, B, C, R)  - [(8XU8B  -
8X/OA)  + Z'.(aSKIoB)]  = 0 in equation  (16). If both  equations  were  evaluated  at the same  values
for  A, B, C and R, then  dU/dS  in  equation (17)  would  be  d/dS  - r(A, B, C, R) -(Z/3).(SK/8C)
- - (Z'/3).(aSK/aC)  < 0, and  tus  e2 <  S3.  Howeve, equations  (16) and (17) are not evaluaed at
the same  values  for  A, B, C  and R,  so  that r(A, B, C, R) is  not necessaly equal  to zero  in equation
(17).
We now show that the  value of  r(A, B, C, R)  (8W8B  -8X8IA) + Z'.(8SKI8B)  can be
ether  positive or negative when evaluated at the quantities pevailing in equation (17).  The
diffence between  equations  (16)  and (17)  is that the subidy at the re  S 3in equation  (16)-is  iet
equal  to zero  on good  C in equation  (17).  hub,  B and A are both  larger  in equation  (17),  8XWB
and 8X/8A  are both smaller,  and the inpact on (8Wo8B  - 8X/8A)  is ambiguous.  lhe impact  on
Z'.(MSK/OB)  is  ambiguous  as  well. At the larger  value  of B in equation  fl  7, aSK/aB  is  likely  to be
32smaller,  but since SK is also lIkely to be smaller,  Z' is larger,  and the impact on Z'.(aSK/aB) is
ambiguous. 2 '  In other words,  the sign of r(A, B, C, R) in equation  (17) is ambiguous. For some
fimctional  forms of X, Zand SK,  r(A, B, C, R) will be negative,  while for othrs,  it will be positive
or zero.
One would need to know the exact  fmnctional  fonns of X Z and SK in order to be able to
deterine  the sign of r(A, B, C, R) in equation  (17). However,  under  symmetry  of the postive and
negaive values for r(A, B, C, R) across all functional  forms for X, Z and SK, one may expect its
average  value to be zeron? 2 And since -(Z'/3).(aSK/aC)  < 0,  one may expect the average  value of
dU/dS  to be negive.  This implies  that  on average,  S2  < e.
It is easy to  show that the reswlt  gnlizes  to Sw' < Sm  for a bloc expansion  from m - I to
m member  counies  in a world of m symmetric  countries  (m 2 3), but not, unforuately,  to S-1 <
S' for a customs  union  of size k (k < m) in a worid of m symmetiic  countries
21Comparing  equiLibria  in equations  (16)  and (17),  a second-degre  Taylor  expansion  of the  difference
in  SK is: ASK - [AB.(aSK/8B)  + AC.(MSKQ8C)]  + [AB 2 .(8 2sK1)  + AC 2 .(8 2SK/aCt)J2 +
(AB.AC.(O 2So'IB8C)J. What  is the  sign  of ASK?  Ihe first  term  in square  brce  is negative.  To show
this,  notetbat  B-  C in equaon (16)  so  hat  MSK/B  - aSK8C,  but  AB  <  -AC  (the ihse  in B is
smaLer  than  the decline  in C because  removal  of the subsidy  on C also  leads  to a rise in consumption  of
A and R, and from  the budget  conain,  -AC  - AA +AB + AR > AB). The  second  tenn in square
bracks  is negative  sine the scond derivatives  are  negative.  (ntutvely, as C fills, 8SK8C rises  so dtat
tie loss  in SK  from addidonal  reducto  in C increases;  similarly,  the  gams  in SK  from  increases  in B
declie with  B). On  the otier hand,  8oSK/aBC  may  be negative  (if Coutry 1 is lss conee  about
securitywih  respect  to Country  2 (3) if security  with  respect  to Country  3 (2) is  higher),  and  the third
term  mi  squae bmckes would  then  be positive.  Thus,  toug  it may  seem  likely ht  removiag  the
subsidy  on imports  of good  C results  in ASK  < 0, this  need  not  be the  case. However,  no  matter  what
the  sign  of  AM,  the fact  remains  tht te  difference  in Z'.(8SK/8B)  is ambiguous. The reason  is that
with an ambiguous  change  in SK,  the changes  in both Z' and in aSK/aB are  ambiguous.
22Stricdy  speing,  whether  the  average  value  of r(A, B, C, D) in equation  (17) is zero  or not
depends  on the definition  of the  domain  of the functions  X. Z and SK.
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